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Abstract 
This study addresses factors and functions of ASEAN to develop Southeast 
Asia‟s security cooperation by focusing on two main regional security institutions – 
the ARF and the APSC. Through qualitative methodology, which involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach, the research will analyze what factors have 
encouraged ASEAN to develop Southeast Asia‟s security cooperation; and also what 
functions of regional institutions to manage security affairs. Representative 
organizations for the regional security institutions are the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and the ASEAN Political-Security Community. 
As for the ARF, in terms of institutional strength, it has been relatively 
successful in engaging the great powers (which was of importance for ASEAN 
member states) and promoting confidence building; however, ASEAN‟s attempt to 
cooperate tactically with external powers appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no 
strategic significance. In case of the APSC, its plan almost failed when ASEAN 
member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict. The 
main reason is that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened 
cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its 
relevance. As a result, the APSC may not able to respond effectively to globalization 
and its dramatic impact on political life and even values of ASEAN members. As 
most researchers say, the APSC is being famous for talking big and acting modestly 
by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the reputation of 
being most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing 
world (Narine, 1998: 195). This regional organization was established on 8 August 
1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by founding 
Fathers, the original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand (other members of ASEAN joined later one by one).
1
 The main aims of 
the creation was to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region as well as 
economic, cultural, and political purposes.
2
 The uniqueness of ASEAN is that this 
organization developed a method of interaction that alleviated tensions among its 
member states. This method is referred to as the “ASEAN Way” and involves the use 
of extensive consultation and consensus building to develop intramural solidarity 
(Narine, 1997: 961-962). 
                                                          
1
 Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, lastly 
Cambodia joined in 1999 by completing all Southeast Asian countries in this organization. 
2
 http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html 
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One more purpose of creating ASEAN was to provide the small states of 
Southeast Asia with some degree of influence over regional events (Narine, 1997: 
965). When ASEAN was formulated, Communism was a threat in Southeast Asia, 
and the small and weak nations feared that they would be pawns in international 
power competitions (Hussey, 1991: 87-88). The communist threat posed by Vietnam 
in particular was an external challenge which motivated ASEAN and strengthened its 
cohesion (Buszynski, 1997/1998: 555). Singapore‟s minister George Yeo once 
declared that “Without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have 
become the regional grouping it is today”.3 At that time in the beginning ASEAN was 
a sub-regional organization that represented the non-Communist part of Southeast 
Asia. As an institution ASEAN acted as a diplomatic vehicle for the coordination of 
regional positions in relation to the Communist subversion and the Cambodian 
conflict in particular. ASEAN helped foster international efforts to bring peace and 
stability to the region, specifically in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia (Buszynski, 1997/1998: 556-561). During the Cold War, ASEAN was the 
major vehicle for curbing the outbursts of intraregional hostility and conflicts that 
marred relationships among the member countries. The members are committed to 
peace and stability throughout the region, and the organization has been an effective 
forum to resolve many disputes (Hussey, 1991: 97). 
                                                          
3
 “Strait Times, 8 December 1993” cited in Buszynski, Leszek (1997/1998: 555) „ASEAN's New 
Challenges‟, Pacific Affairs 76 (4): 555-577. 
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An ASEAN Community is projected to be established comprising three pillars, 
namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural 
cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of 
ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in Southeast Asia (Severino, 
2006: 342-344). The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims to ensure 
that countries in the region to live at peace with one another and with the world in the 
just, democratic and harmonious environment. The members of the Community 
pledges to rely on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences 
and regards their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by 
geographic location, common vision and objectives. It has the following components: 
political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict 
resolution, post-conflict peace building, and implementing mechanisms.
4
 The APSC 
blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based community of shared values and 
norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for 
comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and outward looking in an increasingly 
integrated and interdependent world.
5
 The APSC marks out several areas where 
intensified political and security cooperation is to take place: setting values and 
norms; maritime security; weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and transnational 
crime; defence cooperation; the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and cooperation 
with the United Nations (UN) (Severino, 2006: 355-356). 
                                                          
4
 ASEAN official webpage: http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm 
5
 The APSC blueprint: http://www.aseansec.org/5187-18.pdf 
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For ASEAN, the end of the Cold War came with Vietnam military withdrawal 
from Cambodia in late 1989. In spite of the decline of the Soviet Union, ASEAN 
security policy did not change much because of its northern neighbors. Concerns 
aroused by China‟s rapid growth, its military build-up, and military emphasis which 
increased toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Spratly Islands. In addition to this, 
worrying questions such as Japan‟s future role in the region, disputes in the Korean 
Peninsula, and uncertainty about the American commitment to Southeast Asian 
security came up without answers. Beside these larger issues, there are numerous 
smaller territorial disputes and political tensions in Southeast Asia. Reacting to these 
uncertainties and to the inescapably superior power, the ASEAN governments have 
adopted a multipurpose array of security policies – the ARF. ASEAN seeks through 
the ARF to expand its consensus-building, conflict avoidance process to the region as 
a whole (Denoon and Colbert, 1997/98: 508-509). 
ASEAN leaders recognized that their security to a considerable extent would 
depend on the Asia-Pacific security dialogue that would involve all major actors, but 
they tried to protect their organization from the consequences. With this in mind 
ASEAN leaders attempted to orchestrate the development of regional security 
dialogue in a way that would retain the regional organization as its central feature. 
The ARF was an attempt to meet the need for Asia-Pacific security regionalism while 
maintaining the ASEAN structure. According to the 27
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) in 1994, the ARF was to become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific 
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forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. 
At the 28
th
 AMM in 1995, ASEAN‟s role is emphasized as the primary driving force 
of the ARF (Buszynski, 1997/98: 570-572). The ARF was founded to build 
confidence between states and to reduce the likelihood of conflict between them by 
promoting the notion of “comprehensive security”6 (Severino, 2009: 18-19). 
 
1.2. Objectives of research 
This research tries to attain following objectives: 
- To find out what kind of role ASEAN Security Cooperation plays in 
Southeast Asia; 
- To find out factors which influence ASEAN Security Cooperation; 
- To examine how these factors are important for intra/extra-regional security 
of member states. 
 
                                                          
6
 Comprehensive Security was first formally coined in Japan in the 1970s. The concept is used and 
interpreted in very different ways in different parts of the region. In ASEAN it is interpreted as „an 
over-arching organizing concept for the management of security in the region which might be 
agreeable to all states‟ (Capie and Evans, 2007: 65-74). 
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1.3. Significance of the research 
ASEAN includes cultural, identical very diverse countries. ASEAN provides 
an important and rich area of investigation into the study of security communities. 
Since its formation, ASEAN is portrayed variously as a “region of revolt”, the 
“Balkans of East” and so on. The weak socio-political cohesion of the region‟s 
governments, intra-regional ideological polarization, interstate territorial disputes, 
intervention by external powers were marked features of the geopolitical landscape of 
Southeast Asia. These conflicts posed a threat not only to the survival of some of the 
region‟s new states, but also to the prospects for regional order as a whole (Acharya, 
2001: 4-5). 
In the beginning, the establishment of ASEAN did not inspire much hope for 
peace and stability in the region. At that time, Southeast Asian states were facing a 
number of security issues within and/or among states such as domestic instability 
(armed insurgency, religious movements, regime legitimacy and political succession), 
territorial conflicts (disputes over land borders), maritime disputes (disputes 
overlapping exclusive economic zones, continental shelf) (Thayer, 1998: 100-103). 
But ASEAN survived. By the early 1990s, ASEAN members could claim their 
grouping to be one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the 
developing world. 
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Beside this, there is so much criticism as well as support over the issue of 
whether ASEAN Way could play an indeed role as an ASEAN model vis-à-vis 
Western models of regional cooperation, which are based on legalistic and formalistic 
institutions (Acharya, 2001: 158-163). Some scholars argue that the ASEAN Way 
succeeded as a norm, but at the same time there are a lot critical opinions that give 
controversial arguments. It needs to be studied to what extent it is controversial.   
1.4. Limitations of the study 
There are two limitations in this study, firstly most of articles related to 
ASEAN studies are done on the basis of international relations theories by supporting 
one of the theories. In my study, research will not be based on theories because of my 
lack of knowledge on theories.  
Secondly, this study will be based on secondary sources only such as articles, 
books, newspapers, official reports, related websites etc. The secondary sources may 
not be as effective as primary source such as interview from informants or any 
information directly collected from originators of the evidence to develop my own 
argument. 
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1.5. Chapter outlines 
Chapter II captures several related articles, which explain mainly if ASEAN is 
successful or not as a regional organization in terms of security. Since most 
researchers focus on ASEAN‟s success and/or failure, literature review section is 
divided into three groups by providing ASEAN‟s success supportive articles, 
ASEAN‟s success criticizing articles and also articles, which are not related to above-
mentioned two groups. In other words, the third group does not explain about success 
or failure, but organization itself. Of course, articles related to the ARF are also 
included, since the ARF is ASEAN-led security institution. Accordingly, this chapter 
includes research questions and methodology how to conduct this study. 
 Chapter III is about the ARF, one of the main regional security institutions of 
ASEAN, which also covers whole the Asia Pacific. In this chapter mainly the reasons 
why ASEAN needed to create multilateral framework in a wide Asia Pacific to claim 
ASEAN‟s role among great powers is explained. And also it is complimented with 
the argument if ASEAN could manage its leading role in this higly discussed 
organization among researchers. At the same time it provides information of 
establishment, development of the institution. 
 The APSC, one of the subsections of accelerated ongoing plan of ASEAN 
Community 2015, is covered in the chapter IV. The APSC‟s uniqueness is being 
ASEAN based security community, which is dedicated to solve inter-state security 
 
 
9 
 
problems among ASEAN member states. At the same time it includes ASEAN non-
member countries in some activities such as ADMM-Plus in order to keep up with 
neighboring countries level. It also provides argument if this ASEAN-based security 
community is managing well issues of member states. 
 Finally, chapter V concludes overall sections of this study by providing 
answers to the main questions of this research. The chapter consists of overview of 
the research, answers of the research questions finalizing with the suggestion to the 
future researches.   
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
There are numerous studies for ASEAN in different aspects since its 
establishment. Most of scholars seem to be eager to analyze this regional organization 
from different perspectives of international relations theories. As a result, most of 
studies create mainly two groups according to the opinions of scholars. The first one 
is supportive, in that scholars have positive opinions about ASEAN security 
cooperation as a regional organization. The second one is critical, in that scholars 
have negative or critical opinions about ASEAN. Accordingly, I will divide literature 
into three groups: a) articles with supportive opinions b) articles with critical opinions 
and c) other ASEAN or ARF related articles.  
 
2.1.1. Articles with supportive/positive opinions 
A constructivist scholar Haacke (2003) argued that due to concerns about 
ASEAN‟s image and reputation, some of shared understandings intrinsic to 
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ASEAN‟s long-standing diplomatic and security culture have been relaxed, 
particularly the principle of non-interference. Norms associated with the „ASEAN 
way‟ are still perceived to serve the important and necessary function of helping to 
mediate estrangement and insecurity among ASEAN leaderships, as well as limiting 
interference by non-ASEAN states. According to the analysis demonstrated, the 
majority of ASEAN governments, while prepared to refine their approach to 
preventive diplomacy and norms of intramural conduct, remain unprepared to accept 
the loss of salience of the original meaning of the core norms of the Association‟s 
long-standing diplomatic and security culture. It is highlighted the value of insights in 
relation to the significance of seeking recognition in international politics. The article 
showed how individual ASEAN countries have accepted in general that the 
Association‟s international recognition depends on leaving behind certain aspects of 
the „ASEAN way‟, particularly – albeit not exclusively – as regards the norm of non-
interference. 
Another constructivist scholar Acharya (2001) argues that the concept of 
security community is the most useful framework to examine the evolution and 
nature of ASEAN‟s political and security role and identify constraints it faces in 
developing a viable regional security community. The framework of this study 
focuses on the interplay of norms, socialization and identity formation in ASEAN‟s 
approach to regional order and assesses how this interplay shaped ASEAN‟s progress 
and potential to be regional security community. Regional socialization is important, 
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because the existence and the continued survival of ASEAN have been highly 
improbable on the basis of the traditional indicators of regionalism. The sheer 
diversity among ASEAN members in terms of size, populations, cultural and 
linguistic differences, and political systems predisposes Southeast Asia against a 
viable form of regionalism. Acharya concludes his book by mentioning that in 
promoting peaceful intra-regional relations; ASEAN – one of the most successful 
regional organizations in the developing world – now is in serious need to reinvent 
itself. The nature and extent of this transformation will be crucial to determining 
whether it will be an ascendant or redundant instrument of regional peace and 
stability.         
Ba (2005) is continuing the debate by offering a constructivist reply to the 
review by Khoo (2004) on Amitav Acharya‟s book7. She argues that a realist scholar 
Khoo may miss an important point that this is an organization that was formed in a 
particular context and to respond to particular kinds of problems. Ba adds to 
Acharya‟s argument that ASEAN achieved at least nascent security community status, 
which is strengthened by a more pointed discussion of the building-up processes (e.g. 
social learning, communicative process, quality of interaction). This process is 
                                                          
7
 Khoo, Nicholas (2004) „Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay‟, 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 4: 35-46 reviewed Acharya‟s book (2001) Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge. Article is summarized in the following 
subsection “Articles with critical/negative opinion”. 
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associated with the first stages of security communities. Ba concludes that both 
Acharya and Khoo provided us with much to think how to stimulate discussions 
about theory and causation and the role of norms and institutions, as much as about 
evolving international relations in Southeast Asia. 
 
2.1.2. Articles with critical/negative opinions 
Narine (1998) argues that ASEAN‟s ability to manage regional security in 
Southeast Asia is limited by two factors. The first factor is the interests and actions of 
great powers. These interests and actions define the parameters of ASEAN‟s security 
policies. The second is divergent security perceptions and interests within ASEAN. 
They explain the limits of intra-organizational cooperation and made it difficult to 
evaluate the significance of ASEAN‟s stated security objectives. Moreover Narine 
holds that the aforementioned factors affecting ASEAN during the Cold War are still 
at work even after the Cold War and it significantly limits its ability to shape the 
regional environment. Different opinions of ASEAN states over security perceptions 
created internal tensions, and ASEAN was largely dependent on external support in 
order to be an effective regional actor. As another factor, ASEAN significantly 
improved its internal relationships, but a strong sense of collective identity still 
eluded the member states. Many political, cultural, and historical barriers were 
standing in the way of such an identity. For the most part, their commitment to 
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ASEAN remained limited by a narrow understanding of their self-interests. In the 
post-cold war period, regional uncertainty created the impression that the region‟s 
security environment may be amenable to ASEAN‟s corporate influence. 
Narine (1997) in his another article argues that the political, economic, and 
strategic considerations that have made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do 
not necessarily apply to the more powerful states of the Asia Pacific region. He 
explains his argument by emphasizing the importance of understanding the context in 
which ASEAN evolved and secondly, by examining the limitations of the ASEAN 
Way.
 8
 As author contends the qualities accounting for ASEAN‟s success do not 
assume the same configuration within the ARF. The ARF includes the world‟s 
militarily powerful states and encompasses the entire Pacific Rim. ASEAN‟s 
techniques are unique to the conditions of the time in which they developed and the 
nature of its members. 
Scholar Khoo (2004) is arguing that Amitav Acharya‟s recent claim that a 
nascent security community is emerging in Southeast Asia is flawed for at least four 
reasons: 1. Acharya fails to adequately explain why the norms he privileges emerged 
                                                          
8
 ASEAN has developed a method of interaction that has alleviated tensions among its member states. 
This method is broadly referred to as the "ASEAN way" or the "ASEAN process," and involves the 
use of extensive consultation and consensus-building to develop intramural solidarity. Many ASEAN 
political leaders and observers have suggested that ARF adopt the ASEAN way of approaching 
security issues in the Asia-Pacific region: "The emphasis . . . [for ASEAN] is on process (Narine, 
1997: 962). 
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as ASEAN‟s dominant norms. According to Khoo‟s theoretical perspective, the book 
represents a missed opportunity to engage in the burgeoning theoretical literature 2. A 
critical flaw in Acharya‟s argument relates to its tautological nature. There is a failure 
to conceptualize norm robustness independent of the effects attributed to norms, thus 
leading to tautology. 3. From an empirical perspective, the dependent variable, the 
nascent ASEAN security community, has arguably never existed. The author thinks 
that Acharya‟s emphasis on norms, socialization and identity as causal variables 
leading to a security community is really much ado about nothing. 4. Alternative 
explanations for ASEAN are not fully explored. Author is mentioning that a problem 
of many [constructivist] studies is a neglect of alternative explanations, particularly 
realist ones, for the effects attributed to norms. According to the Khoo‟s argument, 
this analysis suggests that constructivists should recalibrate their research lenses. 
2.1.3. Other related articles 
Collins (2007) analyzed the formation of a security community by taking 
lessons from ASEAN. The author is arguing that ASEAN has never been a nascent 
security community but has instead been a security regime and therefore its norm 
compliance does not provide evidence of community building. However, ASEAN‟s 
norms indicate that it is a nascent security community ready to transform itself into a 
fully-fledged security community. According to Collin‟s opinion, if ASEAN is to 
form a security community, it is only when the governing elite enables elites 
representing regional civil society organizations (CSOs) to have an influence on 
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policy formation that such a community can be established. This is because regional 
CSOs can generate a common identification among the people, which is essential for 
community formation and by representing that common identification in the decision 
making process, CSOs can play a prominent role in decision making. Such a 
development encourages community formation because it enables the people to take 
ownership of the community‟s development, thus both endangering a greater sense of 
common identity and introducing to the decision-making process. 
Katsumata (2004), in answering the question “Why has ASEAN diplomacy 
been changing?”, addresses two supplemental questions: first, why it was in the late 
1990s that ASEAN diplomacy began to change; and second, why some of the 
members have promoted a flexible interpretation of the non-interference principle, 
while others are rather reluctant to modify the ASEAN Way of diplomacy. Katsumata 
gives explanation from the point of two different opinions. A conventional/rationalist 
explanation holds that the ASEAN countries began to have open and frank discussion 
in order to deal with new challenges, such as economic and environmental issues, in 
an efficient way. Constructivists explain ASEAN‟s change by focusing on the global 
normative shift, which emphasizes human rights and democracy. 
In another article Katsumata (2006) seeks to offer a sounder explanation from 
a constructivist perspective to a conventional explanation of the establishment of the 
ARF that it was an attempt on the part of ASEAN to maintain US military 
engagement in Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China in 
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the post-Cold War era. He tries to answer according to different perspectives of 
international relations theories and finds that the most appropriate view is 
constructivist, since the ARF is a norm-oriented framework. Other neo-liberal and 
realist views‟ explanations are not entirely wrong, but insufficient. In the norm-
oriented framework of the ARF, the participants seek regional peace and cooperation, 
because cooperative behavior meets the standard of appropriateness in the light of 
relevant norms. Therefore, for constructivists, the cooperative security is significant 
in terms of norms, although it may appear a “talking shop” with no strategic 
significance. 
Heller (2005) discusses the structure and functioning of the ARF and analyses 
the relevance of the ARF to the interests of its central members such as ASEAN 
states and most powerful national actors such as the United States, Japan and China. 
The author argues that the ARF is a forum that reflects the convergence strategic 
interests of both regional and external actors. It is concluded by stating that the ARF 
is not sufficiently effective to secure peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, 
nevertheless there are no institutions, which could offer alternative solution. 
 
2.2. Critical assessment of the past literature 
Most of articles of past literature were focusing on ASEAN/the ARF security 
issues from the point of theoretical perspectives and argued that ASEAN either is a 
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successful regional organization or unsuccessful one. It is not so clear if ASEAN was 
successful in terms of what. Some studies are done by arguing if ASEAN is nascent 
security community or ascendant one and there is a big discussion among scholars. 
As a result it is still not decided which one is more appropriate for ASEAN as a 
regional organization. 
There is not much study about ASEAN Political-Security Community. Since 
this community is one of the main components of ASEAN‟s community-building I 
will try to give more comprehensive analysis of the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community as well as the ARF and any other security cooperation studies of ASEAN.  
     
2.3. Research questions 
1. What factors have encouraged ASEAN to develop Southeast Asia‟s security 
cooperation? 
2. What are the functions of regional institutions to manage security affairs (APSC 
and the ARF)? 
 
2.4. Research methodology 
The method of this research is qualitative, which involves an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 3). In this 
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research it consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that are collected from 
secondary sources such as articles, books, newspapers, and websites and so on. In 
addition, data will also be collected from respective government reports, and other 
official documents which will provide useful information for the regional 
organization. 
The approach for the qualitative method will be case study, which provides 
in-depth understanding of a case (in this study the case is regional security 
institutions in Southeast Asia) by analyzing data through description of the case and 
themes of the case (Creswell, 2007: 73-81). The general structure of the approach 
includes problem questions, case study, data collection, description of the case, 
development of issues, details about selected issues and also assertions.   
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Chapter III 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
 
3.1. Introduction 
ASEAN‟s efforts to manage regional security in the post-cold war era are 
exemplified by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By establishing 
the ARF, which is known as the first truly multilateral security forum covering the 
wider Asia Pacific region, ASEAN was attempting to use the present state of regional 
uncertainty to its own advantage by adopting new policies and creating new 
structures. According to some scholars‟ opinions including Acharya (2001: 165-167), 
the ARF was seen by ASEAN as a device for engaging great powers such as the US, 
Japan, Russia, and China in the region so as to maintain a stable regional balance of 
power. 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first explains the process of the 
establishment of the ARF by providing motivations to establish the ARF. The second 
section discusses the development of the ARF including the Concept Paper, which is 
the core rule of the ARF followed by expansion of new members to the ARF. It also 
includes objectives and achievements of the ARF by giving prominent scholars‟ 
arguments whether it is successful and/or useful institution or not in order to support 
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my own analysis. And finally, the role of the ARF in ASEAN will follow previous 
sections. The conclusion of this chapter provides main findings relevant to my 
research questions.  
3.2. Establishment of the ARF 
At the end of the Cold War, some regional specialists and policy-makers 
suggested that traditional bilateral security arrangements would not be sufficient to 
address a rising regional interdependence and cope with the uncertain security 
environment in East Asia. This led to a variety of proposals to promote 
multilateralism (Emmers, 2003: 30-31). Some leaders in 1986 called for the creation 
of an Asian-Pacific equivalent to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). At the ASEAN-PMC in 1990, foreign ministers of Australia and 
Canada suggested separately an Asia-Pacific conference on security and cooperation. 
But this was opposed by the United States that feared the potential weakening of its 
bilateral security arrangements. In addition, most East Asian leaders felt 
uncomfortable with a European model for cooperation (Emmers, 2003: 111-113).  
With Foreign Minister Nakayama‟s proposal for a multilateral forum in 1991, 
Japan played an active role in promoting a security dialogue in Asia and Pacific 
region. Together with the first dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces in 1992 and 
positive statement by Prime Minister Miyazawa in Bangkok in 1993, the 
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum became a diplomatic success from the 
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Japanese perspective (Sudo, 2002: 88-89). Referring to Nakayama‟s statement, Yukio 
Satoh, president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs recalls (Severino, 2009: 
9-10): 
The proposal did not receive much pronounced support on the spot. In hindsight, however, the 
Nakayama proposal and subsequent Japanese diplomacy arguably made significant 
contributions to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum.  
 
3.2.1. The process of establishment of the ARF 
About the reason why the ARF was established, Fukushima (2003: 276-277) 
mentions that unlike Europe, which has multilateral and multilayered security 
governance institutions such as the NATO, the EU and the OSCE, Asian countries do 
not share common threat and they did not have multilateral security frameworks 
during even after the cold war. On the contrary, they are mutually suspicious of the 
military intentions of other states within the region. In this context, Severino (2009: 
7-8) gives following reasons why the concept of CSCE was not applicable for the 
Asia Pacific.  
After all, there were numerous territorial disputes, major and minor, between Asia Pacific 
states, in which neither protagonist was willing to back and down – between Japan and China, 
Japan and Russia, Japan and Koreas, Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, and there was 
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the whole question of the overlapping claims to all or parts of the South China Sea. Freezing 
the borders across the board would obviously not be possible or acceptable, as it was in 
Europe. Indeed, Japan rejected any analogy with the CSCE, fearing that that would damage 
its efforts to regain the “northern territories”, islands that the Soviet Union had seized at the 
end of the Pacific War.  More broadly, the conditions in Europe and the Asia Pacific were 
immensely different in a great number of ways, including the vast variety of the political 
systems in the Asia Pacific. 
Post-Cold War multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific seemed to 
be dependent on an extension of the ASEAN model to a wider region. The idea of 
using PMC as a forum for regional security was officially discussed during the 1991 
AMM and confirmed at the highest level during the fourth ASEAN summit, held in 
Singapore in 1992. Encouraged by Tokyo and Washington, a first ASEAN-PMC 
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was organized in Singapore in May 1993. The 
foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and of the seven dialogue partners – Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and the EU – 
decided at the meeting to invite the foreign ministers of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, 
and Papua New Guinea, to a special session in the same year. In the same year, it was 
agreed that the first working session would take place in Bangkok one year later. The 
first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 (Emmers, 2003: 30-31). 
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3.2.2. ASEAN’s motivations to establish the ARF 
Amidst the power shifts and uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, many 
states in the Asia Pacific region particularly ASEAN, saw the need for a new political 
security framework that would help them maintain the necessary equilibrium for 
sustainable peace and prosperity in the region (Caballero-Anthony, 2005: 124-125). 
ASEAN leaders were very conscious of the danger that an Asia Pacific security 
dialogue would result in the displacement of the organization. At the 26
th
 AMM, the 
Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong stressed that ASEAN must not allow its 
future to be decided by external powers and emphasized the need to maintain 
organizational cohesion.
9
 Severino (2009: 12-13) mentions following statement: 
“ASEAN also saw that grafting the new forum onto ASEAN would ensure that 
Southeast Asians had a voice in whatever arrangements and processes would emerge 
in the new security environment.” ASEAN‟s decision to establish the ARF resulted 
from several motivations. The most important of them were the end of the Cold War, 
fear of American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN 
countries, and rise of China in Asia.    
The end of the Cold War confronted ASEAN with new challenges as well as 
opportunities for trying to reshape regional order. The end of the US-Soviet and Sino-
                                                          
9
 “Business Times, 24 July 1993” cited in Buszynski, (1997/98: 571), ASEAN's New Challenges. 
Pacific Affairs, 555-577. 
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Soviet rivalries contributed to a substantial reduction in regional tensions and the 
prospect for competitive external intervention in Southeast Asia. However, ASEAN 
members became concerned about a “power vacuum” in the region, which might lead 
to new kinds of conflicts and rivalry involving external powers (Acharya, 2001: 167-
168). The Southeast Asian countries were concerned about East Asia being 
dominated by a more assertive Japan and a rising China. Moreover, the smaller 
Southeast Asian countries were eager to maintain their diplomatic status in the 
regional arena. These circumstances at the end of the Cold War were an impetus to 
reshape the regional order through the of Asia-Pacific multilateralism (Emmers, 
2008: 194-196). 
One of other motives was to keep the United States engaged in Southeast Asia 
despite its traumatic experience in Indochina and the end of the Cold War and despite 
Washington‟s misgivings about multilateral security arrangements in the Asia Pacific, 
might tend to undermine its bilateral defense alliances or be perceived as a cover for 
American withdrawal. Changes in the regional strategic environment forced the 
ASEAN countries to question their sub-regional approach to security. This primarily 
resulted from the external origins of post-Cold War security challenges and the 
strategic and economic interdependence linking their sub-region to the rest of the 
Asia Pacific. It was regarded by ASEAN as a diplomatic instrument to promote a 
continuing the US involvement in the region and to encourage China into habits of 
good international behavior. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant to 
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ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. Its members needed to avoid being 
excluded from a strategic architecture that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-
US triangle. ASEAN hoped therefore to consolidate its diplomatic position by further 
developing its stabilizing role in Southeast Asia and beyond. 
However there was a motivation for the possibilities of intra-regional 
organization, which ASEAN‟s own contributions to regional security. Intra-regional 
relations of ASEAN countries may be divided into three categories. Firstly, the 
spillover affect of domestic conflicts, especially ethnic, political, ideological 
challenges to state structure and regime security. Secondly, disputes over territory 
between Malaysia-Singapore, Malaysia-Indonesia, Thai-Malaysia, Malaysia-Brunei, 
Philippines-Malaysia, which leads to interstate tensions bordering on violence. 
Additionally, disputes exist in the maritime arena over issues such as boundary 
demarcation, exclusive economic zones, fishing rights and resource exploitation. 
Thirdly, relations of countries are tested by lingering animosities which have ethnic, 
cultural, religious and nationalist roots. It creates big tensions between especially 
neighbor countries (Acharya, 2001: 129-133, 178). As the Philippine‟s Defense 
Secretary Fidel Ramos argued: “The foundation of regional stability and security in 
our region would be truly solid if the ASEAN countries could forge collaborations 
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among themselves and reduce their dependency on outside actors for their defense 
and nation-building requirements.”10 
In the post-Cold War era, a possible scramble among regional powers namely 
Japan and to lesser extent, India raised fears in ASEAN members. But especially 
China‟s rising power was the most central issue facing the ASEAN members 
(Emmers, 2001: 119). Potential regional hegemony by China feared especially 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines regarding the growing salience of problems 
such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea by encouraging ASEAN states to 
be in the driver seat of the ARF (Acharya, 2001: 177-179). The ASEAN members 
appeared to believe that the ARF norms based on standard international norms would 
encourage China not to threaten its smaller partners (Emmers, 2001: 117-118). In this 
way ASEAN states considered how to manage rise of China by promoting and 
strengthening conditions for regional peace and stability (Ba, 2009: 179-184). 
However, China could not afford to be left out of a multilateral security forum that 
included the most significant regional states (Emmers, 2001: 117). China also had its 
own political and economic interest to maintain with other powerful states as well as 
relatively small partners.      
                                                          
10
 “Philippine Minister Calls for ASEAN Defense Cooperation”, Xinhua, 25 November 1989 quoted in 
Ba, (2009: 171) “[Re] Negotiating East and Southeast Asia”, Stanford, Stanford University Press.   
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3.3. Development of the ARF 
The 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, 
which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed to establish the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF). The First Meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 
July 1994 in accordance with the 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN 
Summit, whereby the ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed their 
intent to intensify ASEAN‟s external dialogues in political and security matters as a 
means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Attending 
the Meeting were the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, ASEAN‟s Dialogue Partners11, 
ASEAN‟s Consultative Partners China and Russia, and ASEAN‟s observers or their 
representatives Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Thailand, served as Chairman of the Meeting.
12
 It was the first time that 
ministers of countries in East Asia and of the major powers with interests in the 
                                                          
11
 ASEAN‟s Dialogue Partners included Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, 
Republic of Korea, and the United States which were ASEAN‟s major trading partners with the aim of 
secure technical assistant for regional cooperation projects; promote trade and economic relations; and 
strengthen political relations with third countries and regional groupings by Pushpanatan, (2003) 
ASEAN‟s Strategy towards its Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Plus Three Process, ASEAN COCI 
Seminar on ASEAN New Issues and Challenges: http://www.asean.org/15397.htm 
12
 ARF Document Series 1994-2006, The First ARF, 25 July, 1994: 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/ARF-Publication/ARF-Document-Series-1994-
2006/01_Bangkok2006.pdf 
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region sat down together to discuss issues having to do security and stability in the 
Asia Pacific, including measures to strengthen regional security and stability 
(Severino, 2009: 14-15). 
The main objectives of the ARF are following statements as confirmed in the 
First ARF Chairman's Statement (1994): 
1. To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security 
issues of common interest and concern; 
2. To make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and 
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
13
 
  
3.3.1. The ARF’s development process 
The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that "The ARF could 
become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on 
political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work 
with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of 
                                                          
13
 The First ARF, 1994, ARF Chairman‟s Statement: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansSt
atementofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx 
 
 
30 
 
relations in the Asia Pacific".
14
 The ARF was an attempt to meet the need for Asia 
Pacific security regionalism while maintaining the ASEAN structure. External actors 
recognized that ASEAN was the only effective substructure for an Asia-Pacific 
security dialogue and were willing to accommodate ASEAN needs in this respect 
(Buszynski, 1997-1998: 570-571).  
The chairman of the first meeting made his following statement:  
Being the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the 
Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the 
Meeting was considered a historical event for the region. More importantly, the Meeting 
signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast Asia. 
The participants of the Meeting held a productive exchange of views on the current political 
and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing that developments in one part of 
the region could have an impact on the security of the region as whole. It was agreed that, as a 
high-level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to 
foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern. In this respect, the ARF would be in a position to make 
                                                          
14
 ARF Document Series 1994-2006, The First ARF, 25 July, 1994: 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/ARF-Publication/ARF-Document-Series-1994-
2006/01_Bangkok2006.pdf 
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significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
15
 
Moreover the first meeting agreed to convene the ARF on an annual basis and 
hold the second meeting in Brunei Darussalam in 1995. It also endorsed the purposes 
and principles of ASEAN‟s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast 
Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic 
instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and 
security cooperation (Severino, 2009: 15). These principles include the peaceful 
settlement of inter-state disputes, the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the 
relations between states, and non-interference in one another‟s internal affairs.16 
The second meeting of the ARF ministers in Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 
August 1995 was devoted largely to shaping and defining the forum‟s nature, 
purposes, and processes. These were embodied in two documents. One was the 
Concept Paper drawn up in ASEAN and cleared with the other ARF participants. The 
other was the Chairman‟s Statement drafted by the Brunei chair, worked out within 
ASEAN, and negotiated with the other participants. The chairman‟s statement 
defined the character of the ARF as “a forum for open dialogue and consultation on 
regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views 
                                                          
15
 The First ARF, 1994, ARF Chairman‟s Statements and Reports: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansSt
atementofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx 
16
 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm 
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between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk of security”. According to the 
statement, the ministers agreed that the ARF should “move at a pace comfortable to 
all participants” (Severino, 2009: 16-17). 
In the statement organization of the ARF is mentioned in the following way: 
 There shall be an annual ARF in the context of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences to be preceded by ARF-SOM; 
 The ARF process would move along two tracks. Track one activities will be 
carried out by ARF governments. Track Two activities shall be carried out by 
strategic institutes and relevant non-governmental organizations to which all 
ARF participants should be eligible. To be meaningful and relevant, the ARF 
Chairman shall ensure that Track Two activities result from full consultations 
with all ARF participants; and 
 The ARF shall be apprised of all Track One and Track Two activities through 
the current Chairman of the ARF, who will be the main link between Track 
One and Track Two.
17
 
The following table shows the annual ARF meeting and important decisions taken 
in the meetings every year.  
                                                          
17
 Chairman‟s Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the ARF: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansSt
atementofthe2ndMeetingoftheASE/tabid/199/Default.aspx 
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Table 3.1. The process of the ARF activities according to each year meetings  
# Place, date Joined members The ARF process 
1 Bangkok,  
25 July 1994 
ASEAN (except 
Cambodia, 
Myanmar), 
dialogue, 
consultative 
partners and 
observers 
Agreed to endorse the purposes and 
principles of ASEAN‟s Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a 
code of conduct governing relations 
between states and a unique diplomatic 
instrument for regional confidence-
building, preventive diplomacy, and 
political and security cooperation. 
2 Bandar Seri 
Begawan,              
1 August 1995 
Cambodia 
Considered and endorsed the Report of 
the Chairman of the ARF-SOM. They 
adopted the proposals in the context of 
the Concept Paper. 
3  Jakarta,  
23 July 1996 
India, Myanmar 
Considered the guiding principles and 
criteria suggested in the Chairman‟s 
Paper on Criteria for Participation in the 
ARF as recommended by the ARF-
SOM. 
4 Subang Jaya,  
27 July 1997 
 
Welcomed the entry into force of the 
SEANWFZ Treaty
18
 which represents 
an important effort of Southeast Asian 
                                                          
18
 The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty or the Bangkok Treaty of 
1995, is a nuclear weapons moratorium treaty between 10 Southeast Asian member and obliges its 
members not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear 
weapons. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/seanwfz.pdf 
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states towards strengthening the security 
in the region and towards the 
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones globally. 
5 Manila,  
27 July 1998 
Mongolia 
Agreed to consider the call of the TAC 
High Contracting Parties for non-
Southeast Asian states, particularly the 
major powers, to accede to the Treaty 
after the Second Protocol enters into 
force. 
6 Singapore,  
26 July 1999 
 
Recognized the Treaty of Amity and 
Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 
as a key regional instrument for 
strengthening security in the region. 
 
7 Bangkok,  
27 July 2000 
Democratic 
People‟s Republic 
of Korea 
Welcomed the establishment of the ARF 
Register of Experts/Eminent Persons to 
be available for use by ARF members 
on the voluntary basis, and the first 
volume of the ARF Annual Security 
Outlook (ASO), produced by individual 
participants on a without editing by the 
ARF Chair. 
8 
Ha Noi,  
25 July 2001 
 
Agreed to adopt the Paper on the 
Enhanced Role of ARF Chair, of which 
most of the work done by Japan. 
9 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan,  
 
Welcomed the establishment of an Inter-
sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 
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31 July 2002 and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-
TC) and noted a Concept Paper 
submitted by the United States and 
Malaysia would serve as a good basis 
for the work of the new ISM. 
10 Phnom Penh,  
18 June 2003 
 
Welcomed the establishment of the 
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for 
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and also the 
establishment of the APEC Counter-
Terrorism Task Force. 
Source: ARF Documents Series: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-publication/459.html 
 
3.3.2. The ARF’s Concept Paper 
The Concept Paper was drawn up in ASEAN and was approved with the other 
ARF participants. The Concept Paper noted the region‟s great diversity in size, level 
of development, culture, ethnic make-up, religion and history. Because of this 
diversity, the ARF participants had different approaches to matters of peace and 
security, which in turn, required what it called “a consensual approach to security 
issues”. In this paper, it was stressed that the ASEAN model of cooperation could be 
emulated by the rest of that region, since ASEAN fostered habits of cooperation, and 
provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region. Then, the paper recommended three stages for the evolution of the ARF – 
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confidence building, the development of mechanisms for “preventive diplomacy”, 
and over the long term, modalities for conflict resolution. 
19
 In terms of process, the 
ministers noted that “ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be primary driving force” 
while assuring the other participants of their “active, full and equal participation”. 
The Concept Paper laid down some ground rules for the forum. One was that 
the ministerial meeting would take place annually on the occasion of the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting under ASEAN chairmanship. The ARF would not have a 
secretariat. Decisions would be made by consensus. The forum would progress “at a 
pace comfortable to all participants”. This was evidently to give reassurance that 
nobody would railroad or ram through measures that others might deem to be 
threatening to them. The third stage – originally “development of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms” – would now be “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”. According to 
Severino (2009: 17) these cautious formulations are the result of the worry of some 
delegations, notably the Chinese that attempts at multilateral conflict resolution 
would give certain powers the sanction to get involved in issues like, for example, the 
South China Sea or the Taiwan problem, not to mention internal dissent or separatism. 
                                                          
19
 The concept of the Preventive Diplomacy was first introduced by former U.N. Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which is “action to prevent disputes from arising between the parties, to 
prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they 
occur”, An Agenda for Peace, 1992 cited Yuzawa, (2006: 787) „The Evolution of Preventive 
Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects‟, Asian Survey 46 (5): 785-804. 
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3.3.3. Expansion of new members to the ARF 
At the official level, the creation of the ARF started with the call of the 
ASEAN Summit for ASEAN to use the Post-ministerial Conference (PMC) to 
intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters. The ASEAN 
Dialogue system, of which the PMC is the centerpiece, originally intended to link 
ASEAN with leading developed countries for economic purposes as well as to 
intensify discussion of political and security issues in the past particularly with 
respect to the Asia Pacific. As preparations got underway it became clear to 
ASEAN‟s officials and Dialogue Partners that discussion of regional political and 
security matters would not be effective without the participation of China, Russia or 
Vietnam, none of which was at that time an ASEAN member or Dialogue Partner. 
Therefore, it was quickly decided to bring in ASEAN‟s “consultative partners” – 
China and Russia, and observers – Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam. 
In addition to the ARF‟s initially conceived members – ASEAN‟s members, 
Dialogue Partners, consultative partners and observers – the ARF had the European 
Community (to expand later into the European Union), the only non-state participant 
in the ARF. France and United Kingdom sought to take part in the ARF on their own, 
separately from the EU. Their claim was based on several factors such as being 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, being recognized nuclear-weapon 
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states and so on. However, ASEAN has not been able to reconcile the proposed 
separate involvement of France and United Kingdom with continued participation of 
the EU. 
From the beginning, the ARF made it clear that it was open to participation by 
others in addition to its original composition. According to the ARF‟s Concept Paper, 
“Applications to participate in the ARF shall be submitted to the Chairman of the 
ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants”.20 Being requested by the 
second ARF ministerial meeting, the Indonesian chairman produced a paper 
proposing criteria for admission to the forum in the round of consultations with other 
ARF participants (Severino, 2009: 23-24). 
The participation criteria adopted in July 1996 by the ARF are following: 
 Commitment: All new participants, who will all be sovereign states, must 
subscribe to, and work cooperatively to help achieve the ARF's key goals. 
Prior to their admission, all new participants should agree to abide by and 
respectfully the decisions and statements already made by the ARF. All 
ASEAN members are automatically participants of ARF. 
 Relevance: A new participant should be admitted only if it can be 
demonstrated that it has an impact on the peace and security of the 
                                                          
20
 The ARF‟s Concept Paper: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/TheASEAN
RegionalForumAConceptPaper/tabid/200/Default.aspx 
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"geographical footprint" of key ARF activities (i.e. Northeast and Southeast 
Asia as well as Oceania). 
 Gradual expansion:  
Efforts must be made to control the number of participants to a manageable 
level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF. 
 Consultations: All applications for participation should be submitted to the 
Chairman of the ARF, who will consult all the other ARF participants at the 
SOM and ascertain whether a consensus exists for the admission of the new 
participant. Actual decisions on participation will be approved by the 
Ministers.
21
 
In its third year, the ARF participants were concerned about any rapid 
expansion of the forum. Prudently, ASEAN and the other ARF participants agreed 
that the ARF should expand carefully and cautiously. As the ARF process is barely 
three years old, it would be advisable to consolidate the ARF process before 
expanding it rapidly. Efforts must be made to control the number of participants to a 
manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF.
22
 
In 2000, North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun wrote to the ARF 
chairman seeking participation in the regional forum, and an application was swiftly 
                                                          
21
 The ARF Participation Criteria: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html 
22
 The Third ARF, 23 July, 1996, Guiding Principles (iii): 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/ARF-Publication/ARF-Document-Series-1994-
2006/03_Jakarta2006.pdf 
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granted. From 1994 to 1999, the Korean situation had been intensively discussed at 
the ARF in the absence of North Korea. Since Pyongyang‟s admission, the ARF has 
continued to express support for negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. From 2001 to 2007, North Korea contributed to no less than five issues of 
the ARF‟s Annual Security Outlook. The ARF managed to bring North Korea into a 
comprehensive multilateral forum on security issues, the only one outside the United 
Nations in which Pyongyang sits together with the US, Japan and other developed 
countries. In the ARF North Korea can state and clarify its positions in a multilateral 
setting and listen to those of other participants. At the same time, the ARF has been 
an interested bystander in the complex process of bringing about the denuclearization 
of Korean Peninsula, with its accompanying threats and counter-threats, diplomatic 
moves and counter moves, and mutual accusations of non-compliance with previous 
agreements. 
  India joined the ARF in 1996 becoming Dialogue Partner from Sectoral 
Dialogue Partner. Pakistan joined the ARF in 2003 after ASEAN resolved the 
disagreements among its members on the matter, although India initially opposed the 
joining not only because Pakistan was considered to be outside the ARF “footprint”, 
but also because of concerns that Pakistan might raise its bilateral disputes with India 
at ARF meetings. Timor Leste joined the ARF in 2004 after its independence in 2002. 
But Timor Leste is remained ambivalent on ASEAN membership. In 2006 and 2007, 
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Bangladesh and Sri Lanka joined the ARF with the view that South Asia should not 
be represented in the ARF by India alone (Severino, 2009: 27-29). 
The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States, and 
Vietnam.
23
 
            
3.3.4. Achievements of the ARF 
On the tenth year of the ARF, the ARF Ministers met in Phnom Penh on 18 
June 2003 and declared that "despite the great diversity of its membership, the forum 
had attained a record of achievements that have contributed to the maintenance of 
peace, security and cooperation in the region." They cited in particular:  
 The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue 
and consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue 
and cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, 
incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all; 
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 The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security 
issues in a multilateral setting; 
 The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities; 
 The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and security 
issues; 
 The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of 
information relating to defense policy and the publication of defense white 
papers; and 
 The networking developed among national security, defense and military 
officials of ARF participants.
24
 
Being existed for more than 15 years, one of the main objectives of ASEAN 
countries, to keep the US in the region, in establishing the ARF was achieved. The 
US is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs. Its ongoing presence is a great 
source of stability although its commitment to multilateral institutions is little. The 
reason is that the US is giving preference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum (Emmers, 2009: 8). The other little success is that the South China Sea, 
a source of potential conflict in the region during the early 1990s, was relatively calm 
untill 2009. One of the major reason is that China agreed to discuss the South China 
Sea disputes at the multilateral level with ASEAN at the level of confict prevention. 
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 The Tenth ARF, 18 June, 2003: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/ARF-Publication/ARF-
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If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea 
disputes from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly 
enhance its prestige as a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160). 
Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued that the ARF has lost 
its momentum. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and 
other issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the 
region. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian 
security relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have 
increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have different 
expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored in the 
“ASEAN Way” (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF 
was ASEAN‟s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers, although it 
appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. In sum, it can be 
mentioned that in terms of institutional strength, the ARF has been relatively 
successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building; however, 
it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194-
195).    
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3.4. The role of the ARF for ASEAN  
The ARF is important for ASEAN for several reasons. First, it can help 
contribute to peace, stability and mutual understanding in the Asia Pacific region, of 
which Southeast Asia is an important and strategic part. To some extent, adverse 
security developments in other parts of the region impact negatively upon ASEAN‟s 
wider political, security and economic interests. Second, the ARF enables ASEAN to 
play a leading role in shaping the security processes in the wider Asia Pacific region. 
ASEAN seeks to foster processes that are in harmony with its views on how security 
cooperation should proceed in the region. Third, the ARF process allows small and 
middle powers to hold a significant voice in regional security affairs and inhibits the 
major powers from dominating and dictating the regional security agenda. Fourth, 
ASEAN‟s leadership of the process facilitated the participation of countries like 
China which would otherwise hesitate due to concerns that the process may be 
dominated by the United States and its friends. China‟s participation is critical to 
ASEAN because of China‟s centrality in many issues (Hassan, 1998: 57-59). 
ASEAN settled on the name of the ARF in order to ensure the centrality of the 
Southeast Asian association‟s role in it (Severino, 2009: 13). The role of ASEAN in 
the ARF is mentioned in the Concept Paper of the ARF also as following:  
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ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing 
regional cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. It has also fostered 
habits of cooperation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the 
wider Asia-Pacific region. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed 
significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the 
Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and 
prosperity of its participants.
25
 
As Simon (2008: 264) mentions, Southeast Asia contains no great powers 
with global reach. This region pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia 
neighbors.
26
 Yet, Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate 
and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. 
For example, ASEAN is able to maintain its pivotal position in Asian affairs, 
especially in the ARF. Organizationally, the ARF's highest level is its annual foreign 
minister‟s meeting, always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating 
chairmanship. In addition to this, ASEAN goal with respect to outside powers joining 
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 ARF‟s Concept Paper: 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Terms%20of%20References%20and%20Concept%2
0Papers/Concept%20Paper%20of%20ARF.pdf 
26
 Simon Sheldon (2008: 265) explains it by following sentences: “From a geopolitical perspective, the 
Asian littoral divides into three sub-regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Both 
Northeast Asia and South Asia contain political and economic Great Powers. Japan, China, South 
Korea and Taiwan play significant global economic roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major 
political-security players. By contrast, Southeast Asia contains no Great Powers with global reach.” 
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the ARF was to extend the aims and principles of ASEAN's TAC to ARF members, 
meaning that all agree to resolve disputes peacefully. The activist states within the 
ARF (the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada) have promoted a PD agenda, 
but the ASEAN Way procedure requiring consensus has effectively blocked it. Here, 
we it can be mentioned that ASEAN plays crucial role in the ARF.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
As it is pointed out in a number of researches, the end of the Cold War 
motivated ASEAN to establish a multilateral security institution to engage great 
powers, but at the same time to show its centrality in it. As a result, the ARF was 
established based on the principles of inclusiveness and cooperative security in order 
to focus on dialogue, confidence building and the sharing of information.  
ASEAN‟s decision to establish the ARF was the end of the Cold War, fear of 
American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN 
countries, and rise of China in Asia. Existing for more than 15 years, ASEAN, in 
some extent, achieved its objectives by keeping the US in the region, and to keep 
small ASEAN states among big states through the organization, driven by ASEAN.  
However, there are arguments by lots of scholars that ASEAN‟s attempt to 
cooperate tactically with external powers resulted with a mere “talking shop” with no 
strategic significance. The ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great 
 
 
47 
 
powers and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move 
toward preventive diplomacy.  
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Chapter IV 
ASEAN Political-Security Community 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) is one of the pillars of the 
ASEAN Community by enhancing political and security cooperation to a higher 
plane. The APSC aims to ensure that the countries in Southeast Asia live in peace 
with one another and with the world in a just, democratic, and harmonious 
environment. Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the 
idea of comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, 
peaceful conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. A framework of this 
nature represents one of the ultimate goals of ASEAN, which has achieved a record 
of political cooperation since its inauguration (Shoji, 2008: 17-18). 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explains what the 
APSC is including the creation of the APSC. The second section discusses the 
establishment of the APSC. This section includes the Bali Concord II and the 
Vientiane Action Plan. The third section discusses the evolution towards the APSC 
by analyzing achievements and role of the APSC. This part consists of three 
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subsections – ASEAN Charter, the ADMM and lastly Thai-Cambodian conflict. The 
conclusion of the chapter provides main findings relevant to the research questions. 
 
4.2. What is the APSC 
The APSC is one of the pillars of an ASEAN Community by 2020, which was 
established at Bali ASEAN Summit with so-called Bali Concord II in 2003. The 
APSC was first known as ASEAN Security Community and was renamed as the 
APSC in the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The APSC is to serve as the umbrella for 
bringing ASEAN‟s political and security cooperation to a higher plane (Sukma, 2012: 
136). In order to strengthen ASEAN integration ASEAN Leaders decided to 
accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. Moreover it was 
agreed to accelerate the establishment and signed at the Cebu Declaration on the 
Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015 in 2007.
 27
 ASEAN Community was 
initially resolved to establish by ASEAN Leaders at the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003. 
At this declaration, the concrete outcomes of the First Coordinating Conferences for 
the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action were welcomed.   
The APSC has its own blueprint with the main aim to ensure that countries in 
the region live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and 
harmonious environment. The APSC Blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based 
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50 
 
Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient 
region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic 
and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world.
 28
 
The members of the Community pledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in 
the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally 
linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and 
objectives, which includes political development; shaping and sharing of norms; 
conflict prevention; conflict resolution; post-conflict peace building; and 
implementing mechanisms.
29
 
The APSC subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security, which 
acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-cultural and 
environmental dimensions of development. It promotes renunciation of aggression 
and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with 
international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of dispute. In this regard, it 
upholds existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in 
South East Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ), which play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building 
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51 
 
measures, preventive diplomacy and pacific approaches to conflict resolution. It also 
seeks to address non-traditional security issues.
30
    
 
4.3. Proposals for the establishment of the APSC 
The establishment of the APSC initially started at the Bali Concord II. The 
proposal of the ASEAN Security Community came from Indonesia. According to 
Sukma, ASEAN had been floating without a sense of purpose since the 1997 
economic crisis.
31
 But at the same time it was also motivated by Jakarta‟s desire, as it 
was assuming the chairmanship of the ASEAN Standing Committee to reaffirm its 
leadership in ASEAN, which called some doubt by its neighbors since the downfall 
of Indonesia‟s leader Suharto (Acharya, 2009: 259-260). It allowed Jakarta to reclaim 
its position as the strategic center for regional security. Sukma‟s comment gives clear 
example for the proposal: “If Indonesia did not push for closer security cooperation 
through the APSC now it will need to wait for ten years before its turn come again”.32 
Sukma had other reasons behind the Indonesian initiative such as concerns over 
                                                          
30
 Non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states 
that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious 
diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and 
transnational crime, Consortium of non-traditional security studies in Asia: http://www.rsis-
ntsasia.org/ourConsortium/history.html 
31
 A key architect of the proposal of ASC, Jakarta based think-tank, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
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Singapore-Malaysia tensions, the need to dilute the non-intervention principle, and 
the need for a security pillar for ASEAN to complement the Singapore-proposed 
ASEAN Economic Community (there could not be an economic community without 
a political-security foundation). 
However, the proposal was greeted by skepticism and big discussion from the 
beginning. Most of the ASEAN members related it to the acknowledgement on 
Indonesia‟s part that some of the initial ideas introduced were highly problematic. 
While ASEAN members are generally supportive of the APSC concept, it was in the 
specific details and actual modalities of the APSC that objections and obstacles arose. 
One of the highly discussed points in the concept was “Peace Keeping Force”. Being 
author of the original APSC concept paper, Sukma explained that there was a lack of 
clarity over APSC because Indonesia had not adequately explained the concept.
33
  
Singapore‟s Foreign Minister Jayakumar argued that ASEAN was the wrong 
entity to play a peacekeeping role, re-emphasizing that ASEAN was not a security or 
defense organization. By supporting Singapore‟s argument, Vietnam‟s Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Dy Nien stated that it was „too early‟ to consider establishing a 
peacekeeping force, and such a peacekeeping force would be fraught with difficulties 
because „each country has its own policy about politics and the military‟ (Acharya, 
2009: 264-265). Thailand‟s Foreign Affairs Minister Surakiart Sathirathai also 
rejected the idea of a peacekeeping force. He was saying that it was unnecessary to 
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form an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force because „there is no conflict in the region 
which would need the mobilization of such a force.‟ The Philippines expressed its 
concern that the APSC would replicate the failure of earlier regional security 
organizations. The Philippines‟ Foreign Minister Blas Ople recalled the failure of the 
US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), warning that it was 
important that the wider Asian community did not interpret the APSC as a case of 
ASEAN „ganging up against anybody‟.  
Malaysia has not issued any official pronouncement on the proposed ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Force. However, Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar‟s comments are 
as followed: “We [ASEAN Leaders] agree that it is not our goal to create a military 
bloc. Our focus for the ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring 
society and human security.”34 He added that defense cooperation between members 
was on a bilateral basis and that such an issue should not be included in the APSC 
(Kuah, 2004: 1-3). Consequently, based on aforementioned comments of ASEAN 
member states, the mechanisms such as ASEAN Peace Keeping Force, ASEAN 
Maritime Forum, ASEAN Maritime Safety and Surveillance Unit, and ASEAN Non-
Aggression Treaty were dropped in the final version (Acharya, 2009: 264). But in the 
finally approved draft, such mechanisms as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance 
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Agreement, the ASEAN Extradition Treaty, and the ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism were accepted from the original Indonesian draft.
35
 
With the motivation of Jakarta‟s proposal to create the ASEAN Security 
Community, Indonesia tried to strengthen its role in ASEAN after the downfall of 
Suharto (Acharya, 2007: 25). The other reason was still ongoing neighborly disputes 
and civil unrest among ASEAN member countries, which gave challenges to regional 
peace and security. For example, border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, 
civil unrest in Thailand, domestic instability in Myanmar should be solved by the 
APSC to preserve the well-being of the community (Lim, 2011: 33-34). The creation 
of the APSC would help to strengthen relations of ASEAN member states. Even 
though most of ASEAN member states were against in the beginning, it was a very 
important motivation for all the members to implement their own security potential in 
the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN in the intra-region level. 
Although most ASEAN states were arguing regarding some parts of the concept 
paper by Indonesia, the general idea of the security community was good point for 
ASEAN. Sukma‟s paper referred to the salience of addressing non-traditional threats, 
which was important for ASEAN. Because ASEAN has recently been interested in 
non-traditional security concerns, including terrorism and piracy, illegal migration, 
environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and natural disasters. Along with and 
based on arguments in the academic society, ASEAN has developed the APSC 
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concept, which focuses on non-traditional security as one of its major fields of 
cooperation for the purpose of realizing a “comprehensive” security community 
(Shoji, 2008: 24). 
 
4.3.1. Bali Concord II 
A Bali ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003 was important for signing of the “Bali 
Concord II”, signifying a rededication to the political, economic and social goals 
expressed at the first Bali Summit in Indonesia. The goal was to create a dynamic, 
cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community by the year 2020.
36
 Among 
three pillars, the ASEAN Security Community (APSC) was promoted by Indonesia. 
The goal is heightened political and security cooperation. The Indonesian proponents 
underline that it is not a military alliance or defense pact. It does not provide for new 
regional security structures. It is based on existing instruments such as the ZOPFAN, 
SEANWFZ, and TAC (Weatherbee, 2009: 105). The Bali Concord II reaffirms the 
basic principles and policies of ASEAN regional security. 
The Bali Concord II charts the future direction of ASEAN security 
cooperation by setting forth the next steps to be taken in this regard. Basically, it is 
stated as “to bring ASEAN‟s political and security cooperation to a higher plane” and 
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it marks out seven areas where intensified political and security cooperation is to take 
place: 
 Setting values and norms; 
 Maritime security; 
 Weapons of mass destruction; 
 Terrorism and transnational crimes; 
 Defense and cooperation; 
 The ASEAN Regional Forum; 
 Cooperation with the UN (Severino, 2006: 355-367). 
As shown in the previous premises, the Bali Concord II sets out the basic 
framework of the APSC as follow. The aim of the APSC is to ensure that ASEAN 
countries live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and 
harmonious environment. It then stipulates that ASEAN members shall rely 
exclusively on peaceful measures to settle intra-regional differences. It further states 
that the APSC seeks comprehensive security with broad political, economic, social 
and cultural aspects, rather than a defense pact, military alliance or joint foreign 
policy.
37
  
The contents of the Bali Concord II make it clear that the APSC concept is the 
culmination of security cooperation fostered by ASEAN since its inception. It lists by 
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name the various treaties and declarations concluded by ASEAN in the past and the 
statement in the preamble that ASEAN members “are determined to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or manner” is similar to 
the expression used in the ZOPFAN Declaration. 
 
4.3.2. Vientiane Action Plan  
The Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) is adopted in Vientiane at the Tenth 
ASEAN Summit in 2004. The Chairman‟s Statement announced the adoption of the 
VAP to realize the end goals of the ASEAN Vision and the Bali Concord II at a time 
when Southeast Asia faced changes in the regional and international situation such as 
terrorist attacks and avian flu.
38
 In this action plan ASEAN member states included 
the initiation of “the preparatory activities to develop an ASEAN Charter” as a goal 
in the VAP, which was formalized into mandate in 2005 (Villacorta, 2011: 306). It 
strengthens further ASEAN as institutional framework both in terms of its structure 
and process to ensure that it is responsive to the challenges and needs of moving 
towards an ASEAN Community, including in terms of coordination and efficiency as 
well as in strengthening its ability to shape events in Southeast Asia and beyond.  
The VAP began with items related to the APSC; it stated that the APSC 
subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security, and that it viewed political and 
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social stability, economic prosperity, and equitable development as strong 
foundations for the ASEAN Community. The VAP was to implement the proposed 
APSC by growing a democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community 
(Emmerson, 2005: 180). Being consistent with the APSC Plan of Action, the VAP for 
the APSC shall be pursued along five strategic thrusts, namely, political development, 
shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-
conflict peace-building, the implementation of which shall focus on actions that are 
conceivably achievable by 2010.
39
 
Conscious that the strengthening of ASEAN integration through accelerated 
establishment of the ASEAN Community will reinforce ASEAN‟s centrality and role 
as the driving force in charting the evolving regional architecture, the ASEAN 
Leaders decided to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. 
At this acceleration the ASEAN Security Community was changed slightly and 
renamed as the ASEAN Security Political Community, which includes political 
aspect as well. In 2009, the VAP was replaced by the Roadmap for the ASEAN 
Community, known as Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration, which was signed by ASEAN 
leaders in Thailand.
 40
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4.4. Evolution towards the APSC 
The evolution of the APSC discussions are still underway and the cooperative 
framework has yet to be fully formed (Shoji, 2008: 17). However, over the period 
from 2003 to 2006, discussions gave rise to a number of concrete results paving the 
way toward the establishment of the APSC, including the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (the Bali Concord II) of 2003, which called for the establishment of the 
APSC; the Vientiane Action Program of 2004, ASEAN Charter in 2008, which put 
forward the policy challenges to be overcome in order to form the APSC; and the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers‟ Meeting, which represents the first step in the formation 
of the APSC. 
 
4.4.1. ASEAN Charter 
The ASEAN Summit in 2005 appointed an Eminent Persons‟ Group (EPG) to 
guide the development of the ASEAN Charter as a step towards the development of 
the ASEAN Community. The charter initiative was aimed at transforming ASEAN 
from non-binding political association to becoming an international organization with 
a legal personality and a rule-based organization with an effective and efficient 
organizational structure (Acharya, 2009: 267). The ASEAN Charter serves as a firm 
foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and 
institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values; 
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sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance. The 
ASEAN Charter entered into force on 15 December 2008. A gathering of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very 
historic occasion for ASEAN. With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, 
ASEAN will henceforth operate under a new legal framework and establish a number 
of new organs to boost its community-building process. The ASEAN Charter has 
become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN member states.
41
 
The ASEAN Charter would establish the association as a juridical personality 
and legal entity. It would make clear the association‟s objectives. The charter would 
envision arrangements for the further integration of the regional economy and define 
the institutions, mechanisms and processes for dealing with transnational problems. 
Indicative recommendations for the contents of the proposed the ASEAN Charter are 
preamble, establishment, flag, logo and the ASEAN Day, objectives, principles, 
economic integration, collective responsibility, the ASEAN Summit, council of 
foreign ministers, council of economic ministers, council of finance ministers, other 
ministerial bodies, senior officials and technical committees, ASEAN standing 
committee, Secretary-General, secretariat, funding, decision-making, settlement of 
disputes, entry into force, amendment, language, and conclusion (Severino, 2005: 7-
29). 
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There were at least two possible motivations for ASEAN to establish the 
ASEAN Charter. According to the opinion of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi, first one was to create an international legal personality for ASEAN. Second 
one was the legal framework for incorporating ASEAN decisions, treaties and 
conventions into the national legislation of the member states (Acharya, 2009: 268). 
In my opinion, the other motivation was to define ASEAN‟s objective in a clear way, 
which was almost lost in its way, and also argued and mostly criticized by lots of 
scholars since its establishment for 40 years. Severino (2005: 7) confirms it by his 
following sentences: “The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which 
the association‟s members adhere. The charter would envision the arrangements for 
further integration”. It establishes set of rules and new structures. 
The ASEAN Charter is expected to be a positive development, which could 
move ASEAN ahead in terms of security as well. But, it was a disappointment. 
ASEAN was at a crossroads, with the adoption of the Charter, ASEAN member states 
decided to codify existing norms, which is the ASEAN Way – the lowest common 
denominator for all ASEAN states. ASEAN did less than it could have done (Desker, 
2008: 1). About the activities of the charter Katsumata (2007: 2-3) mentions that 
ASEAN is now seeking to reverse the trend of its declining credibility, therefore he 
does not wonder if the content of the Charter is probably impressive. At the same 
time, he suggests that ASEAN should focus on what the ASEAN members will do 
after the summit, rather than on what they will announce at the summit. The real 
 
 
62 
 
challenge for them is to implement the provisions of the Charter, after announcing 
them, in other words, their challenge is to translate their big talk into concrete actions, 
and to take concrete steps to reform their association. 
The charter should not simply be drafted to maintain the status quo, but it 
should give new dynamism to ASEAN and should be forward looking. Simply 
codifying the existing norms, rules, and practices will be far from adequate. The 
charter should also make ASEAN more people-oriented and move away from being 
state-centric, as is largely the case at the moment (Wanandi, 2006:86). The Charter 
can still provide an opportunity for change that should not be missed (Caballero-
Anthony, 2008: 80-82).  The standing of ASEAN Charter has a potential of a key 
player in the Asia Pacific region. As Singapore‟s representative Tommy Koh (2007) 
points out in his paper, ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will need 
political will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and effective 
organization, unless it will remain as a paper like so many constitutions of 
countries.
42
  
 
4.4.2. ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting 
The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the highest defense 
mechanism within ASEAN. Meanwhile, the ADMM was one of the results arising in 
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2006 from the movement to form the APSC. The APSC Plan of Action had set 
working toward convening an annual ADMM as one of its objectives, with the aim of 
enhancing confidence-building measures to prevent conflict.
43
 The concept paper 
drawn up by the secretariat stated that the ADMM would complement the existing 
security dialogues of cooperative frameworks such as the ARF. 
The annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN defense ministers to discuss and 
exchange views on current defense and security issues and challenges faced in the 
region. The ADMM aims to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater 
understanding of defense and security challenges as well as enhancement of 
transparency and openness. The ADMM is the newest Sectoral Ministerial Body for 
ASEAN. Its inaugural meeting was convened in Kuala Lumpur, 2006.
 44
 The main 
aim of the creation of the ADMM was to contribute to the establishment of the 
ASEAN Security Community as stipulated in the Bali Concord II and to promote the 
implementation of the VAP on the ASEAN Security Community (Chalermpalanupap, 
2011: 20). Convening regular ASEAN defense ministers meetings has become an 
important element in realizing the ASEAN Security Community, specifically its Plan 
of Action for conflict prevention. This meeting is a new step signifying ASEAN's 
shift in focus to embark upon closer military ties (Prawindarti, 2006: 1) 
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To guide the ADMM cooperation, the Three-Year ADMM Work Program 
(2008-2010) was adopted at the 2nd ADMM in Singapore in 2007.
 45
 The Work 
Program (2008-2010) included measures and activities in five areas, namely – a) 
promoting regional defense and security cooperation; b) shaping and sharing of 
norms; c) conflict prevention; d) conflict resolution, and e) post-conflict peace 
building. 
At the 2nd ADMM meeting in 2007, the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper was 
adopted.
46
 Following this, in October 2010 the inaugural ADMM-Plus was convened, 
opening up ASEAN‟s now highest level security and defense mechanism with eight 
of its dialogue partners – the US, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, India 
and the Republic of Korea. The purpose is to bring expertise, perspectives and 
resources from extra-regional countries to bear on shared security challenges. At all 
times, ASEAN countries should collectively weigh the benefits of engaging extra-
regional countries.
47
 The ADMM Plus will serve as an integral part of the ADMM, 
bringing together ASEAN and its dialogue partners to forge common security 
outlooks and set in place practical defense cooperation and collaboration (Haywood, 
2011: 3). At the Inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting, the Defense Ministers agreed on 
five areas of practical cooperation to pursue under this new mechanism: a) maritime 
security, b) counter-terrorism, c) disaster management, d) peacekeeping operations 
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 ADMM Three-Year Work Program: http://www.aseansec.org/21214.pdf 
46
 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper:  http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf 
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 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper:  http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf 
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and e) military medicine. To facilitate cooperation on these areas, five Experts' 
Working Groups (EWGs) were established. By the end of 2011, all of the EWGs 
have held their inaugural meetings.
48
 Concept Paper of the EWG was adopted.
49
 
In establishing ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has explicitly acknowledged the 
important role which extra-regional powers have to play in securing its members and 
the Southeast Asian sub-region from non-traditional security threats (Rolls, 2011: 11). 
According Rolls (2011: 5-8) it is clear that “ASEAN‟s survival and role have been 
dependent on, and shaped by, a wider regional balance of power system”. One of the 
objectives of the ADMM is to complement the ARF, which means the ASEAN-
driven regional architecture that addresses political and security challenges in the 
Asia Pacific region is now more complete. Although the difference between the ARF 
and ADMM Plus is very little, current focus of ADMM Plus is security of non-
traditional variant, which includes humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and even 
working with civil society organizations on non-traditional security issues. The 
establishment of the ADMM Plus is important in a political aspect in order to keep 
close relations with East Asian Summit members, and to keep balance of power 
regarding to rising China as well.   
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At the inaugural meeting of the ADMM, Myanmar was absent, which put an 
immediate test to the notion of the ASEAN Security Community (Prawindarti. 2006: 
2). The absence of Myanmar, which maybe probably due to pressing domestic 
concerns and domestic engagements, was accepted as limit of the ADMM. ASEAN 
states are cautious that there may be still the possibility that the problem of Myanmar 
might intensify and develop serious discord in the region (Shoji, 2008). Nonetheless, 
this fear is less possible, since there is happening drastic change in the political 
situation of Myanmar. On the contrary, political situation in Myanmar was courage to 
create and develop the ADMM initiation. Nonetheless, ADMM is being not enough 
efficient without its dialog partners (ADMM Plus), which indicates that ASEAN 
itself is still weak and dependent on great powers. 
 
4.4.3. Thai-Cambodian conflict 
 The Thai-Cambodian conflict played a crucial role for ASEAN especially the 
APSC, in order to check efficiency of ASEAN member states to use the potential role 
of the APSC. 
The clashes that erupted on February 4th of 2011 were the fiercest since July 
2008, when the two armies first began rumbling at each other in the vicinity of Preah 
Vihear, an 11th-century Khmer temple that Cambodia wants to develop for mass 
tourism. Six people died and dozens more were injured during four days of fighting. 
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The temple itself was slightly damaged. Each side accused the other of firing first 
into populated areas.
50
 For centuries, the ancient Preah Vihear temple, a Hindu 
masterpiece, has stood largely unmolested on a cliff overlooking the Thai-Cambodian 
border. However, over past three years, the temple has been an increasing point of 
conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that appears to be fomented for purely 
domestic political motives.
51
 
 The historical basis of the dispute goes back at least five centuries. The year 
1421 heralded the decline of the Khmer Empire; for that was the year the Thais 
captured the Angkar Wat – the symbol of the Khmer glory. During French expansion 
into Indochina in the 19th century, in the Franco-Thai Treaties of 1887 and 1893, the 
Siamese Government renounced all claims to the whole of the territories on the left 
bank of the Mekong river. By another series of treaties during 1904-07, Thailand 
ceded to France the border provinces of Battambang, Sisophon and Siem Reap. 
Thailand took advantage of the Second World War to regain part of what it had lost. 
As a reward for their cooperation with the Japanese, Thailand got back the border 
provinces in the Tokyo convention of March 1941.  
In 1959, Cambodia instituted legal proceedings against Thailand before the 
International Court of Justice. In May 1961, the Court rejected the preliminary 
objections of Thailand and ruled that it possessed competence. On 15 June 1962, the 
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World Court declared, with nine votes for and three against, that Cambodia held 
sovereignty over the temple of Preah Vihear. In consequence, Thailand was under an 
obligation to withdraw any military or police forces or other guards or keepers, 
stationed by her at the temple or in its vicinity.  
Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia increased in 2008, when the 
crumbling 11th-century Preah Vihear Hindu temple – which the International Court 
of Justice ruled belonged to Cambodia in 1962 – was declared a United Nations 
World Heritage Site over staunch Thai objections. The sovereignty of the land around 
the temple remains in dispute, as do other swaths of land containing other temples 
built during the Khmer Empire‟s reign.52  The clashes around temples in disputed 
areas starkly illustrated the tensions between countries in ASEAN that could derail 
plans to create a single community by 2015, and the apparent inability of the bloc to 
deal with disagreements.
53
  
According to the ASEAN Secretary-General, the recent ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict was cited 
as proof of ASEAN‟s leverage, with the court ordering both parties to allow an 
ASEAN observer team in. He said the world court had rendered a judgment that 
                                                          
52
 The Washington Times, April 28, 2011: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/28/domestic-politics-fuel-thai-cambodian-
dispute/?page=all#pagebreak 
53
 Reuters, May 8, 2011: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08/us-asean-
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would help Thailand and Cambodia find common positions on the way forward to 
resolve the conflict between them. Echoing Secretary-General Pitsuwan, Marty said 
that while he had not read the court‟s decision in its entirety, it was encouraging. “It 
is encouraging to note that the United Nations Security Council and now the ICJ 
recognize that ASEAN has a role to play in helping facilitate resolution of this issue,” 
he told a press briefing after an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) here.
54
 
 The role of the APSC or generally ASEAN in Thai-Cambodia disputes is 
discussed in a different way. According to Haywood (2011: 3), ASEAN approached 
the Thai Cambodian crisis as a significant opportunity to try to engender a more 
effective body vis-à-vis regional security, particularly on more sensitive security 
issues. Indonesia‟s efforts, and its successes, although minimal and incremental, do 
suggest that ASEAN‟s modus operandi, including its apparent limitations of dialogue 
and persuasion, certainly has some practical value. However at the same time critical 
opinions also exist. For instance, Southeast Asian leaders failed to achieve any 
breakthrough to end deadly border skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia that 
overshadowed a regional summit in Jakarta supposed to showcase progress toward 
economic integration. In this article ASEAN‟s role in this dispute is mentioned as 
follow:  
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 The Jakarta Post, April 18, 2012: 
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ASEAN, a collection of authoritarian states and nascent democracies, has a policy of 
non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, and so has struggled to resolve the 
border dispute which – although on the surface about ownership of some ancient 
temples – is being driven by domestic political dynamics in both Thailand and 
Cambodia.
55
 
And also an analyst at OSK-DMG Group in Singapore Enrico Tanuwidjaja 
said “If the Cambodia and Thailand situation gets worse, then I'm afraid they might 
have to postpone it to 2020 or even put it on hold".
56
 The clash has already abused the 
commitment of ASEAN members to the ASEAN Security Community, which defines 
an agreement not to use force to settle differences (Singh, 2011: 3).   
  
4.5. Conclusion 
The proposal Jakarta to create the ASEAN Security Community started with the 
political intention to gain back its role after the downfall of Suharto. There was also a 
very important motivation for ASEAN member states to implement their own 
security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN at the intra-
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 Reuters, May 8, 2011: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08/us-asean-
idUSTRE74709V20110508 
56
 OSK-DMG Group offers a wide spectrum of financial, advisory and investment services. A 
company has a reputation of professionalism, integrity and innovation amongst its clients and partners:  
http://www.osk.com.my/oskv2/pageG.jsp?name=AboutOSK  
 
 
71 
 
region level. After the approving of the proposal, it was followed to the creation of 
the ASEAN Charter, which has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region 
as well as ASEAN states. The ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will 
need political will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and 
effective organization, unless it will remain as a paper. 
Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the idea of 
comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful 
conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. Moreover the new threats posed 
by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, there were plus the new 
strategic developments and balance in East Asia that have and will come with the 
dramatic rise of China, and possibly soon also of India. But for now ASEAN 
members had not answered yet these new challenges adequately. One of these 
challenges was Thai-Cambodia conflict. The APSC plan almost failed when ASEAN 
member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict even 
though ASEAN Secretary-General mentioned this conflict as an opportunity. The 
main reason was that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened 
cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its 
relevance. As a result, the APSC is not able to respond effectively to globalization 
and its dramatic impact on the economy, political life and even values of ASEAN 
members. As Katsumata argued, the APSC is being famous for talking big and acting 
modestly by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result.  
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
5.1. Overview of the research 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the reputation of 
being the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the 
developing world (Narine, 1998: 195). One of the purposes of creating ASEAN was 
to provide the small states of Southeast Asia with some degree of influence over 
regional events (Narine, 1997: 965). When ASEAN was first formulated, 
Communism was a threat in the region, and the nations being small and weak feared 
that they would be pawns in international power competitions. During the Cold War 
ASEAN was the major vehicle for curbing the outbursts of intraregional hostility and 
conflicts that marred relationships among the member countries (Hussey, 1991: 87-
88). This situation led ASEAN member states to think about their own security 
regarding neighboring states as well as great powers. 
The ARF was initiated by ASEAN member states. ASEAN leaders recognize 
that their security to a considerable extent would depend on an Asia-Pacific security 
dialogue that would involve all major actors, but they try to protect their organization 
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from the consequences. The ARF was founded to build confidence between states 
and to reduce the likelihood of conflict between them by promoting the notion of 
comprehensive security (Severino, 2009: 15-19). 
The ASEAN Political-Security Community is one of the pillars of an ASEAN 
Community by 2020, which was established in 2003 with the aims to ensure that 
countries in the region to live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment. The members of the Community pledges to 
rely on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regards 
their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic 
location, common vision and objectives.  
 
5.2. Answer to Research questions 
5.2.1. The ARF 
Being existed for more than 15 years, one of the main objectives of ASEAN 
countries, to keep the US in the region, in establishing the ARF was achieved. The 
US is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs. Its ongoing presence is a great 
source of stability although its commitment to multilateral institutions is little. The 
reason is that the US is giving preference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum (Emmers, 2009: 8). The other little success is that the South China Sea, 
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a source of potential conflict in the region during the early 1990s, was relatively calm 
untill 2009. One of the major reasons is that China agreed to discuss the South China 
Sea disputes at the multilateral level with ASEAN at the level of confict prevention. 
If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea 
disputes from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly 
enhance its prestige as a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160). 
Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued that the ARF has lost 
its momentum. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and 
other issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the 
region. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian 
security relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have 
increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have different 
expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored in the 
“ASEAN Way” (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF 
was ASEAN‟s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers, although it 
appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. In sum, it can be 
mentioned that in terms of institutional strength, the ARF has been relatively 
successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building; however, 
it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194-
195). 
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The ARF is important for ASEAN for several reasons. First, it can help 
contribute to peace, stability and mutual understanding in the Asia Pacific region, of 
which Southeast Asia is an important and strategic part. To some extent, adverse 
security developments in other parts of the region impact negatively upon ASEAN‟s 
wider political, security and economic interests. Second, the ARF enables ASEAN to 
play a leading role in shaping the security processes in the wider Asia Pacific region. 
ASEAN seeks to foster processes that are in harmony with its views on how security 
cooperation should proceed in the region. Third, the ARF process allows small and 
middle powers to hold a significant voice in regional security affairs and inhibits the 
major powers from dominating and dictating the regional security agenda. Fourth, 
ASEAN‟s leadership of the process facilitated the participation of countries like 
China which would otherwise hesitate due to concerns that the process may be 
dominated by the United States and its friends. China‟s participation is critical to 
ASEAN because of China‟s centrality in many issues (Hassan, 1998: 57-59). 
As Simon (2008: 264) mentions, Southeast Asia contains no great powers 
with global reach. This region pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia 
neighbors. Yet, Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate 
and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. 
For example, ASEAN is able to maintain its pivotal position in Asian affairs, 
especially in the ARF. Organizationally, the ARF's highest level is its annual foreign 
minister‟s meeting, always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating 
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chairmanship. In addition to this, ASEAN goal with respect to outside powers joining 
the ARF was to extend the aims and principles of ASEAN's TAC to ARF members, 
meaning that all agree to resolve disputes peacefully. The activist states within the 
ARF (the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada) have promoted a PD agenda, 
but the ASEAN Way procedure requiring consensus has effectively blocked it. Here, 
it can be mentioned that ASEAN plays a crucial role in the ARF.  
As it is pointed out in a number of research, the end of the Cold War 
motivated ASEAN to establish a multilateral security institution to engage great 
powers, but at the same time to show its centrality in it. As a result, the ARF was 
established based on the principles of inclusiveness and cooperative security in order 
to focus on dialogue, confidence building and the sharing of information.  
ASEAN‟s decision to establish the ARF was the end of the Cold War, fear of 
American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN 
countries, and rise of China in Asia. Existing for more than 15 years, ASEAN, in 
some extent, achieved its objectives by keeping the US in the region, and to keep 
small ASEAN states among big states through the organization, driven by ASEAN. 
However, there are arguments by lots of scholars that ASEAN‟s attempt to cooperate 
tactically with external powers resulted with a mere “talking shop” with no strategic 
significance. The ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers 
and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move toward 
preventive diplomacy.  
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5.2.2. The APSC 
With the motivation of Jakarta‟s proposal to create the ASEAN Security 
Community, Indonesia tried to strengthen its role in ASEAN after the downfall of 
Suharto (Acharya, 2007: 25). The other reason was still ongoing neighborly disputes 
and civil unrest among ASEAN member countries, which gave challenges to regional 
peace and security. For example, border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, 
civil unrest in Thailand, domestic instability in Myanmar should be solved by the 
APSC to preserve the well-being of the community (Lim, 2011: 33-34). The creation 
of the APSC would help to strengthen relations of ASEAN member states. Even 
though most of ASEAN member states were against in the beginning, it was a very 
important motivation for all the members to implement their own security potential in 
the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN in the intra-region level. 
Although most ASEAN states were arguing regarding some parts of the concept 
paper by Indonesia, the general idea of the security community was a good point for 
ASEAN. Sukma‟s paper referred to the salience of addressing non-traditional threats, 
which was important for ASEAN. Because ASEAN has recently been interested in 
non-traditional security concerns, including terrorism and piracy, illegal migration, 
environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and natural disasters. Along with and 
based on arguments in the academic society, ASEAN has developed the APSC 
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concept, which focuses on non-traditional security as one of its major fields of 
cooperation for the purpose of realizing a “comprehensive” security community 
(Shoji, 2008: 24). 
There were at least two possible motivations for ASEAN to establish the 
ASEAN Charter. According to the opinion of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi, first one was to create an international legal personality for ASEAN. Second 
one was the legal framework for incorporating ASEAN decisions, treaties and 
conventions into the national legislation of the member states (Acharya, 2009: 268). 
In my opinion, the other motivation was to define ASEAN‟s objective in a clear way, 
which was almost lost in its way, and also argued and mostly criticized by lots of 
scholars since its establishment for 40 years. Severino (2005: 7) confirms it by his 
following sentences: “The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which 
the association‟s members adhere. The charter would envision the arrangements for 
further integration”. It establishes set of rules and new structures. 
The standing of the ASEAN Charter has a potential of a key player in the Asia 
Pacific region. The ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will need political 
will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and effective 
organization, unless it will remain as a paper like so many constitutions of 
countries.
57
 In establishing the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has explicitly acknowledged 
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the important role which extra-regional powers have to play in securing its members 
and the Southeast Asian sub-region from non-traditional security threats (Rolls, 2011: 
11). According to Rolls, it is clear that “ASEAN‟s survival and role have been 
dependent on, and shaped by, a wider regional balance of power system”. One of the 
objectives of the ADMM is to complement the ARF. The establishment of the 
ADMM Plus is important in a political aspect in order to keep close relations with 
East Asian Summit members, and to keep balance of power regarding to rising China 
as well.   
Jakarta‟s proposal to create the ASEAN Security Community started with the 
political intention to gain back its role after the downfall of Suharto. There was also a 
very important motivation for ASEAN member states to implement their own 
security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN at the intra-
region level. After the approving of the proposal, it was followed to the creation of 
the ASEAN Charter, which has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region 
as well as ASEAN states. 
Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the idea of 
comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful 
conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. Moreover, the new threats posed 
by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, there were plus the new 
strategic developments and balance in East Asia that have and will come with the 
dramatic rise of China, and possibly soon also of India. But for now ASEAN 
 
 
80 
 
members had not answered yet these new challenges adequately. One of these 
challenges was Thai-Cambodia conflict. The APSC plan almost failed when ASEAN 
member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict even 
though ASEAN Secretary-General mentioned this conflict as an opportunity. The 
main reason was that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened 
cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its 
relevance. As a result, the APSC is not able to respond effectively to globalization 
and its dramatic impact on the economy, political life and even values of ASEAN 
members. As Katsumata (2007: 1) argued, the APSC is being famous for talking big 
and acting modestly by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result. 
 
5.3. Suggestion to the future researches 
The APSC, which is one of the main parts of the ASEAN, includes a number 
of ongoing projects such as the Vientiane Action Plan, ASEAN Charter and so on. 
Since these plans are not finished yet, the APSC should be researched more with 
more detail regarding accomplishment of the plans. 
Since this study is not based on theoretical perspectives, for the future 
researches it is better to conduct research based on related theoretical perspectives. 
Additionally, comparative study of several theories is also highly recommended. 
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Finally, comparative study of ASEAN with other regional organizations with 
a similar nature such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is also 
established by small, relatively weak states of Central Asia, is suggested. Such kind 
of comparative researches would provide more arguments by pointing out weak and 
strong sides of each organization.   
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